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Analyzing the behavior of agents in a dynamic environment requires describing the evolution
of their knowledge as they receive new information. Moreover agents entertain beliefs that need
to be revised after learning new facts. I might be conﬁdent that I will ﬁnd the shop open, but
once I found it closed, I should not crash but rather make a decision on the basis of new consistent
beliefs. Such beliefs and information may concern ground-level facts, but also beliefs about other
agents. I might be a priori conﬁdent that the price of my shares will rise, but if I learn that the
market is rather pessimistic (say because the shares fell by 10%), this information should change
my higher-order beliefs about what other agents believe.
Tools from modal logic have been successfully applied to analyze knowledge dynamics in multi-
agent contexts. Among these, Temporal Epistemic Logic [16], [12]’s Interpreted Systems, and
Dynamic Epistemic Logic [2] have been particularly fruitful. A recent line of research [8, 7] compares
these alternative frameworks, and [7] presents a representation theorem that shows under which
conditions a temporal model can be represented as a dynamic one. Thanks to this link, the two
languages also become comparable, and one can merge ideas: for example, a new line of research
explores the introduction of protocols into PAL (see [7]).
To the best of our knowledge, there are no similar results yet for multi-agent belief revision.
One reason is that dynamic logics of belief revision have only been well-understood recently. But
right now, there is work on both dynamic doxastic logics [5, 3] and on temporal frameworks for
belief revision with [10] as a recent example. The exact connection between these two frameworks
is not quite like the case of epistemic update. In this paper we make things clear, by viewing belief
revision as priority update over plausibility pre-orders. This correspondence allows for similar
language links as in the knowledge case, with similar beneﬁts.
We start in section 1 with some relevant background, while section 2 gives the main new
deﬁnitions needed in the paper. Section 3 presents the key temporal doxastic properties that we will
work with. In section 4 we state and prove our main result linking the temporal and the dynamic
frameworks, ﬁrst for the special case of total pre-orders and then in general. We also discuss some
variations and extensions. In section 5 we introduce formal languages, providing an axiomatization
for our crucial properties, and discussing some related deﬁnability issues. We state our conclusions
and mention some open problems in the last section. Our key proofs are in the appendix.
∗The second author was supported by a GLoRiClass fellowship of the European Commission (Research Training
Fellowship MEST-CT-2005-020841).
11 Introduction: epistemic background results
Epistemic temporal trees and dynamic logics with product update are complementary ways of
looking at multi-agent information ﬂow. Representation theorems linking both approaches were
proposed for the ﬁrst time in [4]. A nice presentation of these early results can be found in [14,
ch5]. We start with one recent version from [7], referring the reader to [7] for a proof, as well as
generalizations and variations.
Deﬁnition 1.1 (Epistemic and Event Models, Product Update).
• An epistemic model M is of the form  W,(∼i)i∈N,V   where W  = ∅, for each i ∈ N, ∼i is a
relation on W, and V : Prop → ℘(H).
• An event model ǫ =  E,(∼i)i∈N,pre  has E  = ∅, and for each i ∈ N, ∼i is a relation on
W. Finally, there is a precondition map pre : E → LEL, where LEL is the usual language of
epistemic logic.
• The product update M⊗ǫ of an epistemic model M =  W,(∼′
i)i∈N,V   with an event model
ǫ is the model  E,(∼i)i∈N,pre , whose worlds are pairs (w,e) with the world w satisfying the
precondition of the event e, and accessibilities deﬁned as:
(w,e) ∼′
i (w′,e′) iﬀ e ∼i e′,w ∼i w′
Intuitively epistemic models describe what agents currently know while the product update
describe the new multi-agent epistemic situation after some epistemic event has taken place. Nice
intuitive examples are in [1]. Next we turn to the epistemic temporal models introduced by [16].
In what follows, Σ∗ is the set of ﬁnite sequences on any set Σ.
Deﬁnition 1.2 (Epistemic Temporal Models). An epistemic temporal model (ETL model for
short) H is of the form  Σ,H,(∼i)i∈N,V   where Σ is a ﬁnite set of events, H ⊆ Σ∗ and H is closed
under non-empty preﬁxes. For each i ∈ N, ∼i is a relation on H, and V : Prop → ℘H.
The crucial epistemic temporal properties driving [7]’s main theorem are:
Deﬁnition 1.3. Let H =  Σ,H,(∼i)i∈N,V   be an ETL model. H satisﬁes:
Let ∼∗ be the reﬂexive transitive closure of the relation
S
i∈N ∼i:
• Local Bisimulation Invariance if, whenever h ∼∗ h′ and h and h′ are epistemically bisim-
ilar1, we have h′e ∈ H iﬀ he ∈ H.
• Perfect Recall if, whenever ha ∼i h′b, we also have h ∼i h′ .
• Local No Miracles if, whenever ga ∼ g′b and g ∼∗ h ∼ h′, then for every h′a,hb ∈ H, we
also have h′a ∼ hb.
These properties describe the idealized epistemic agents needed in:
1The reader is referred to subsection 3.1 for a deﬁnition of bisimulation invariance.
2Theorem 1.4 (van Benthem et al. [7]). Let H be an ETL model, M an epistemic model, and the
‘protocol’ P a set of ﬁnite sequences of pointed events models closed under preﬁxes. We write ⊗
for product update. Let Forest(M,P) =
S
  ǫ∈P M ⊗  ǫ be the ‘epistemic forest generated by’ M and
sequential application of the events in P. 2 The following are equivalent:
1. H is isomorphic to Forest(M,P).
2. H satisﬁes propositional stability, synchronicity, local bisimulation invariance, Perfect Recall,
and Local No Miracles.
Thus, epistemic temporal conditions characterize just those trees that arise from performing
iterated product update governed by some protocol. [7] and [14, ch5] have details. Our paper
extends this analysis to the richer case of belief revision, where plausibility orders of agents evolve
as they observe possibly surprising events. We prove two main results:
Theorem. Let H be a doxastic temporal model, M a plausibility model,   ǫ a sequence of event
models, and ⊗ priority update. The following are equivalent (details will follow later):
1. H is isomorphic to the forest generated by M ⊗  ǫ
2. H satisﬁes propositional stability, synchronicity, invariance for bisimulation, as well as prin-
ciples of Preference Propagation, Preference Revelation and Accommodation.
Theorem. Preference Propagation, Preference Revelation and Accommodation are deﬁnable in an
extended doxastic modal language.
2 Deﬁnitions
We now turn to the deﬁnitions needed for the simplest version of our main representation theorem,
postponing matching formal languages to Section 5. Let N = {1,...,n} be a ﬁnite set of agents.
2.1 Plausibility models, event models and priority update
We ﬁrst introduce static models that encode the current prior (conditional) beliefs of agents. These
carry a pre-order ≤ between worlds encoding a plausibility relation. Often this relation is taken to
be total, but when we think of elicited beliefs as multi-criteria decisions, a pre-order allowing for
incomparable situations may be all we get [11]. We will therefore assume reﬂexivity and transitivity,
but not totality. We write a≃b (‘indiﬀerence’) if a ≤ b and b ≤ a, and a < b if a ≤ b and b  ≤ a.
Deﬁnition 2.1 (Doxastic Plausibility Models). A doxastic plausibility model M =  W,( i)i∈N,V  
has W  = ∅, for each i ∈ N,  i is a pre-order on W, and V : Prop → ℘H.
We now consider how such models evolve as agents observe events.
Deﬁnition 2.2 (Plausibility Event Model). A plausibility event model (event model, for short) ǫ
is a tuple  E,( i)i∈N,pre  with E  = ∅, each  i a pre-order on E, and pre : E → L, where L is a
doxastic language. 3
2For a more precise deﬁnition of this notion, see Section 2 below.
3This deﬁnition is incomplete without specifying the relevant language, but all that follows can be understood by
considering the formal language as a ‘parameter’.
3Deﬁnition 2.3 (Priority Update; [3]). The priority update of plausibility model M =  W,
( i)i∈N,V   and event model ǫ =  E,( i)i∈N,pre  is the plausibility model M ⊗ ǫ:
• W′ = {(w,e) ∈ W × E | M,w ￿ pre(e)}
• (w,e)  ′
i (w′,e′) iﬀ either e≺ie′, or e≃ie′ and w  i w′
• V ′((s,e)) = V (s)
The idea behind priority update is that beliefs about the last event override prior beliefs. If the
agent is indiﬀerent, the old plausibility order applies. More motivation can be found in [3, 6].
2.2 Doxastic Temporal Models
Deﬁnition 2.4 (Doxastic Temporal Models). A doxastic temporal model (DoTL model for short)
H is of the form  Σ,H,(≤i)i∈N,V  , where Σ is a ﬁnite set of events, H ⊆ Σ∗ is closed under
non-empty preﬁxes, for each i ∈ N, ≤i is a pre-order on H, and V : Prop → ℘H.
Our task is to identify just when a doxastic temporal model is isomorphic to the ‘forest’ gener-
ated by a sequence of priority updates:
2.3 Dynamic Models Generate Doxastic Temporal Models
Deﬁnition 2.5 (DoTL model generated by a sequence of updates). Each initial plausibility model
M =  W,( i)i∈N,V   and sequence of event models ǫj =  Ej,( 
j
i)i∈N,prej  yields a generated
DoTL plausibility model  Σ,H,(≤i)i∈N,V  as follows:
• Let Σ :=
Sm
i=1 ei.
• Let H1 := W and for any 1 < n ≤ m let Hn+1 := {(we1 ...en)|(we1 ...en−1) ∈ Hn and M⊗
ǫ1 ⊗ ... ⊗ ǫn−1 ￿ pren(en)}. Finally let H =
S
1≤k≤m Hk.
• If h,h′ ∈ H1, then h ≤i h′ iﬀ h  M
i h′.
• For 1 < k ≤ m, he ≤i h′e′ iﬀ 1. he,h′e′ ∈ Hk, and 2. either e≺k
i e′, or e≃k
i e′ and h ≤i h′.
• Let wh ∈ V(p) iﬀ w ∈ V (p).
Now come the key doxastic temporal properties of our idealized agents.
3 Crucial Frame Properties for Priority Updaters
We ﬁrst introduce the notion of bisimulation, modulo a choice of language.
43.1 Bisimulation Invariance
Deﬁnition 3.1 (≤-Bisimulation). Let H and H′ be two DoTL plausibility models  H,(≤1,...,≤n),
V   and  H′,(≤′
1,...,≤′
n),V ′ . A relation Z ⊆ H×H′ is a ≤-Bisimulation if, for all h ∈ H, h′ ∈ H′,
and all ≤i in (≤1,...,≤n),
(prop) h and h′ satisfy the same proposition letters,
(zig) If hZh′ and h ≤i j, then there exists j′ ∈ H′ such that jZj′ and h′ ≤′
i j′,
(zag) If hZh′ and h′ ≤′
i j′, then there exists j ∈ H such that jZj′ and h ≤i j.
If Z is a ≤n-bisimulation and hZh′, we call h and h′ are ≤-bisimilar.
Deﬁnition 3.2 (≤-Bisimulation Invariance). A DoTL model H satisﬁes ≤-bisimulation invariance
if, for all ≤-bisimilar histories h,h′ ∈ H, and all events e, h′e ∈ H iﬀ he ∈ H.
3.2 Agent-Oriented Frame Properties
In the following we drop agent labels and the “for each i ∈ N” for the sake of clarity. Also, when
we write ha we will always assume that ha ∈ H. We will make heavy use of the following notion:
Deﬁnition 3.3 (Accommodating Events). Two events a,b ∈ Σ are accommodating if, for all
ga,g′b, (g ≤ g′ ↔ ga ≤ g′b) and similarly for ≥, i.e., a,b preserve and anti-preserve plausibility.
Deﬁnition 3.4. Let H =  Σ,H,(≤i)i∈N,V   be a DoTL model. H satisﬁes:
• Propositional stability if, whenever h is a ﬁnite preﬁx of h′, then h and h′ satisfy the same
proposition letters.
• Synchronicity if, whenever h ≤ h′, we have len(h) = len(h′).
The following three properties trace the belief revising behavior of agents in doxastic trees.
• Preference Propagation if, whenever ja ≤ j′b, then h ≤ h′ implies ha ≤ h′b.
• Preference Revelation if, whenever jb ≤ j′a, then ha ≤ h′b implies h ≤ h′.
• Accommodation if, a and b are accommodating whenever both ja ≤ j′b and ha  ≤ h′b.
These properties are somewhat trickier than in the epistemic case, reﬂecting the peculiarities
of priority update in settings where incomparability is allowed. But we do have:
Fact 3.5. If ≤ is a total pre-order and H satisﬁes Preference Propagation and Preference Revela-
tion, then H satisﬁes Accommodation.
We can also prove a partial converse without assuming totality:
Fact 3.6. If H satisﬁes Accommodation, it satisﬁes Preference Propagation.
By contrast Accommodation does not imply Preference Revelation.
54 The Main Representation Theorem
We start with a warm-up case, with plausibility a total pre-order.
4.1 Total pre-orders
Theorem 4.1. Let H be a total doxastic-temporal model, M a total plausibility model,   ǫ a sequence
of total event models, and let ⊗ stand for priority update. The following are equivalent:
• H is isomorphic to the forest generated by M ⊗  ǫ.
• H satisﬁes propositional stability, synchronicity, bisimulation invariance, Preference Propa-
gation, and Preference Revelation.
4.2 The general case: pre-orders allowing incomparability
While the argument went smoothly for total pre-orders, it gets somewhat more interesting when
incomparability enters the stage. In the case of pre-orders we need the additional axiom of Accom-
modation as stated below:
Theorem 4.2. Let H be a doxastic-temporal model, M a plausibility model,   ǫ be a sequence of
event models while ⊗ is priority update. The following assertions are equivalent:
• H is isomorphic to the forest generated by M ⊗  ǫ,
• H satisﬁes bisimulation invariance, propositional stability, synchronicity, Preference Revela-
tion and Accommodation.
By Fact 3.6, Accommodation also gives us Preference Propagation.
Given a doxastic temporal model describing the evolution of the beliefs of a group of agents,
we have determined whether it could have been generated by successive ‘local’ priority updates of
a plausibility model. Of course, further scenarios are possible, e.g., bringing in knowledge as well.
4.3 Extensions and variations of the theorem
4.3.1 Uniﬁed plausibility models
There are two roads to merging epistemic indistinguishability and doxastic plausibility. The ﬁrst
works with a plausibility order and an epistemic indistinguishability relation, explaining the notion
of belief with a mixture of the two. Baltag and Smets [3] apply product update to epistemic
indistinguishability and priority update to the plausibility relation. A characterization for the
doxastic epistemic temporal models induced in this way follows from van Benthem et al. [7]
Theorem 1.4 plus Theorem 4.2 of the previous subsection. All this has the ﬂavor of working
with prior beliefs and information partitions, taking the posteriors to be computed from them.
However there are also reasons for working with (posterior) beliefs only (see e.g. [15]). Indeed,
Baltag and Smets [3] take this second road, using uniﬁed ‘local’ plausibility models with just one
explicit relation ￿. We brieﬂy show how our earlier results transform to this setting. Due to space
restrictions, we only state the following result which is proved in the extended version of this paper.
6Theorem 4.3. Let H be a uniﬁed doxastic-temporal model, M a uniﬁed plausibility model,   ǫ be a
sequence of uniﬁed event models, while ⊗ is priority update. The following assertions are equivalent:
• H is isomorphic to the forest generated by M ⊗  ǫ,
• H satisﬁes bisimulation invariance, propositional stability, synchronicity, ￿-Perfect Recall,
￿-Preference Propagation, ￿-Preference Revelation and ￿-Accommodation.
4.3.2 Variations: languages and protocols
One issue left open so far may have bothered some readers. Our deﬁnition of event models pre-
supposed a language for the preconditions, and correspondingly, the right notion of bisimulation
in our representation results should match the precondition language used. This issue is discussed
in the extended version of the paper. Also, so far, the same sequences of events were executable
uniformly anywhere in the initial doxastic model, provided the worlds fulﬁlled the preconditions.
This strong assumption might be lifted (cf. [7]) and leads to interesting variations.
5 Dynamic and Temporal Doxastic Languages
To conclude, we turn from structural properties of models to logical logical languages that can
express these, and thus the type of doxastic reasoning our agents can be involved with.
5.1 Dynamic doxastic language
We ﬁrst look at a core language that matches dynamic belief update.
Deﬁnition 5.1 (Dynamic Doxastic-Epistemic language). The language of dynamic doxastic lan-
guage DDEL is deﬁned as follows:
φ := p | ¬φ | φ ∨ φ |  ≤i φ |  i φ | Eφ |  ǫ,e φ
where i ranges over over N, p over a countable set of proposition letters Prop, and (ǫ,e) ranges
over a suitable set of symbols for event models.
Deﬁnition 5.2 (Epistemic Plausibility Models). Epistemic Plausibility Models are the obvious
combination of epistemic models (of section 1) and plausibility models (of section 2), while the
priority update of an epistemic plausibility model is as expected, i.e. the crucial clauses are:
Deﬁnition 5.3 (Priority update).
• (w,e)  ′
i (w′,e′) iﬀ e≺ie′, or e≃ie′ and w  i w′
• (w,e) ∼′
i (w′,e′) iﬀ e ∼i e′ and w ∼i w′
Here is how we interpret the DDE(L) language. A pointed event model is an event model plus
an element of its domain. We write pre(e) for preǫ(e) when it is clear from context.
7Deﬁnition 5.4 (Truth deﬁnition). Let Ki[w] = {v | w ∼i v}. Booleans cases are expected.
M,w ￿  ≤i φ iﬀ ∃v such that w  i v and M,v ￿ φ
M,w ￿  i φ iﬀ ∃v such that v ∈ Ki[w] and M,v ￿ φ
M,w ￿ Eφ iﬀ ∃v ∈ W such that M,v ￿ φ
M,w ￿  ǫ,e φ iﬀ M,w ￿ pre(e) and M × ǫ,(w,e) ￿ φ
Knowledge Ki and the universal modality A are deﬁned as usual.
Reduction axioms. The methodology of dynamic epistemic and dynamic doxastic logics revolves
around reduction axioms. On top of some complete static base logic, these fully describe the
dynamic component. Here is well-known Action − Knowledge reduction axiom of [2]:
[ǫ,e]Kiφ ↔ (pre(e) →
^
{Ki[ǫ,f]φ : e ∼i f}) (1)
Similarly here are the key reduction axioms for  ǫ,e  ≤i  with priority update:
Proposition 5.5. The following dynamic-doxastic principle is sound for plausibility change:
 ǫ,e  ≤i φ ↔ (pre(e) ∧ ( ≤i 
_
{ f φ : e≃if} ∨ E
_
{ g φ : e <i g})) (2)
The crucial feature of such a dynamic ‘recursion step’ is that the order between action and belief
is reversed. This works because, conceptually, the current beliefs already pre-encode the beliefs after
some speciﬁed event. In the epistemic setting, principles like this reﬂect agent properties of Perfect
Recall and No Miracles [8]. Here, they rather encode radically ‘event-oriented’ revision policies,
and the same point applies to the principles we will ﬁnd later in a doxastic temporal setting.
Proposition 5.6. The following axiom is valid for the existential modality:
 ǫ,e Eφ ↔ (pre(e) ∧ (E
_
{ f φ : f ∈ Dom(ǫ)})) (3)
We do not pursue completeness, since we are just after the model theory.
5.2 Doxastic epistemic temporal language
Our epistemic-doxastic temporal models are simply our old doxastic temporal models H extended
with epistemic accessibility relations ∼i. Our main language is as follows:
Deﬁnition 5.7 (Doxastic Epistemic Temporal Language). Here is the DETL syntax:
φ := p | ¬φ | φ ∨ φ |  e φ |  e−1 φ |  ≤i φ |  i φ | Eφ
where i ranges over N, e over Σ, and p over proposition letters Prop.
The language DETL is interpreted over nodes h in our trees (cf. [8]):
Deﬁnition 5.8 (Truth deﬁnition). Let Ki[h] = {h′ | h ∼i h′}. Booleans cases are expected.
H,h ￿  e φ iﬀ ∃h ′ ∈ H such that h′ = he and H,h′ ￿ φ
H,h ￿  e−1 φ iﬀ ∃h ′ ∈ H such that h′e = h and H,h′ ￿ φ
H,h ￿  ≤i φ iﬀ ∃h ′ such that h ≤i h′ and H,h′ ￿ φ
H,h ￿  i φ iﬀ ∃h ′ such that h′ ∈ Ki[h] and H,h′ ￿ φ
H,h ￿ Eφ iﬀ ∃h ′ ∈ H such that H,h′ ￿ φ
85.3 Deﬁning the frame conditions
We will prove semantic correspondence results (cf. [9]) for our crucial properties, using somewhat
technical axioms that simplify the argument. Afterwards, we discuss their intuitive meaning.
5.3.1 The key correspondence result
Theorem 5.9 (Deﬁnability). Preference Propagation, Preference Revelation and Accommodation
are deﬁnable in the doxastic-epistemic temporal language DETL.
• H satisﬁes Preference Propagation iﬀ the following axiom is valid:
E a  ≤i  b−1 ⊤ → (( ≤i  b p ∧  a q) →  a (q ∧  ≤i p) (PP)
• H satisﬁes Preference Revelation iﬀ the following axiom is valid:
E b  ≤i  a−1 ⊤ → ( a  ≤i (p ∧  b−1 ⊤) →  ≤i  b p) (PR)
• H satisﬁes Accommodation iﬀ the following axiom is valid:
E a  ≤i  b−1 ⊤
∧ E [ a  (p1 ∧ E (p2 ∧  b−1 ⊤) ) ∧ [a] (p1 → [≤i]¬p2)]
→ ( ( ≤i  b q → [a] ≤i q)
∧ ( a  ≤i (r ∧  b−1 ⊤) →  ≤i  b r)
(AC)
The preceding correspondence arguments are Sahlqvist substitution cases (cf. [9]). We do not
prove completeness, but here is a nice syntactic counterpart (Fact 5.11) to our earlier Fact 3.5:
Fact 5.10. On total doxastic temporal models the following axiom is valid:
 a (ψ ∧ E (φ ∧  b−1 ⊤)) → (  a (ψ ∧  ≤i φ) ∨ E b (φ ∧  ≤i (ψ ∧  a−1 ⊤)) (Tot)
Fact 5.11.
⊢ ((PP) ∧ (PR) ∧ (Tot)) → (AC) (4)
5.3.2 Two intuitive explanations
Reformulation with safe belief. An intermediate notion of knowledge ﬁrst considered by [17]
has been argued for doxastically as safe belief by [3] as describing those beliefs we do not give up
under true new information. The safe belief modality 2≥ is just the universal dual of  ≥ . Here is
an example of how we can rephrase our earlier axioms:
• H satisﬁes Preference Propagation iﬀ the following axiom is valid on H:
E a  ≥  b−1 ⊤ → ( a 2≥ip → 2≥i[b]p) (PP’)
Such principles reverse action modalities and safe belief much like the better-known Knowledge-
Action interchange laws in the epistemic-temporal case.
9Analogies with reduction axioms Another way to understand the above axioms with existen-
tial modalities is their clear analogy with the reduction axiom for priority update.
 ǫ,e  ≤i p ↔ (pre(e) ∧ ( ≤i 
_
{ f p : e≃if} ∨ E
_
{ g p : e <i g})) (2)
E a  ≤i  b−1 ⊤ → ( ≤i  b p → [a] ≤i p) (PP)
E b  ≤i  a−1 ⊤ → ( a  ≤i (p ∧  b−1 ⊤) →  ≤i  b p) (PR)
The family resemblance is obvious, and indeed, PP and PR may be viewed as the two halves of
the reduction axiom, transposed to the more general setting of arbitrary doxastic-temporal models.
5.4 Variations and extensions of the language
The above doxastic-temporal language is by no means the only reasonable one. Weaker forward-
looking modal fragments also make sense, dropping both converse and the existential modality.
But they do not suﬃce for the purpose of our correspondence.
Proposition 5.12 (Undeﬁnability). Preference propagation, Preference Revelation and Accommodation
are not deﬁnable in the forward looking fragment of DETL
Richer doxastic temporal languages are studied in the extended version of the paper: including
common belief, mixtures of knowledge and beliefs, and unrestricted past and future operators.
6 Conclusion
Agents that update their knowledge and revise their beliefs can behave very diﬀerently over time.
We have determined the special constraints that capture agents operating with the ‘local updates’
of dynamic doxastic logic. This took the form of some representation theorems that state just when
a general doxastic temporal model is equivalent to the forest model generated by successive priority
updates of an initial doxastic model by a protocol sequence of event models. We have also shown
how these conditions can be deﬁned in an appropriate extended modal language, making it possible
to reason formally about agents engaged in such updates and revisions. Our methods are like those
of existing epistemic work, but the doxastic case came with some interesting new notions.
But from where we are standing now, we see several larger directions to pursue:
• A systematic analysis of axiomatic completeness for constrained revision processes, analogous
to the purely epistemic theory of observation and conversation protocols initiated in [7],
• A comparison of our ‘constructive’ DDL-inspired approach to DTL universes with the more
abstract AGM-style postulational approach of [10],
• A theory of variation for agents with diﬀerent abilities and tendencies (cf. [14]),
• Connections with formal learning theory over epistemic-doxastic temporal universes (cf. [13]).
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117 Appendix
Theorem. Let H be a total doxastic-temporal model, M a total plausibility model,   ǫ a sequence of
total event models, and let ⊗ stand for priority update. The following are equivalent:
• H is isomorphic to the forest generated by M ⊗  ǫ.
• H satisﬁes propositional stability, synchronicity, bisimulation invariance, Preference Propa-
gation, and Preference Revelation.
Proof. Necessity. We ﬁrst show that the given conditions are indeed satisﬁed by any DoTL model
generated through successive priority updates along some given protocol sequence. Here, Proposi-
tional stability and Synchronicity are straightforward from the deﬁnition of generated forests.
Preference Propagation Assume that ja ≤ j′b (1). It follows from (1) plus the deﬁnition of
priority update that a ≤ b (2). Now assume that h ≤ h′ (3). It follows from (2), (3) and priority
update that ha ≤ h′b.
Preference Revelation Assume that jb ≤ j′a (1). It follows from (1) and the deﬁnition of
priority update that b ≤ a (2). Now assume ha ≤ h′b (3). By the deﬁnition of priority update,
(3) can happen in two ways. Case 1: a < b (4). It follows from (4) by the deﬁnition of < that
b  ≤ a (5). But (5) contradicts (2). We are therefore in Case 2: a≃b (6) and h ≤ h′ (7). But (7) is
precisely what we wanted to show.
Note that we did not make use of totality here.
Suﬃciency Given a DoTL model M, we ﬁrst show how to construct a DDL model, i.e., a
plausibility model and a sequence of event models.
Construction Here is the initial plausibility model M =  W,( i)i∈N, ˆ V  :
• W := {h ∈ H | len(h) = 1}.
• Set h  i h′ iﬀ ≤i.
• For every p ∈ Prop, ˆ V (p) = V (p) ∩ W.
Now we construct the j-th event model ǫj =  Ej,( 
j
i)i∈N,prej :
• Ej := {e ∈ Σ | there is a historyhe ∈ H with len(h) = j}
• For each i ∈ N, set a 
j
ib iﬀ there are ha,h′b ∈ H such that len(h) = len(h) = j and ha ≤i h′b.
• For each e ∈ Ej, let prej(e) be the formula that characterizes the set {h | he ∈ H and len(h) =
j}. By general modal logic, bisimulation invariance guarantees that there is such a formula,
though it may be an inﬁnitary one in general.
Now we show that the construction is correct in the following sense:
Claim 7.1 (Correctness). Let ≤ be the plausibility relation in the given doxastic temporal model.
Let 4F
DDL be the plausibility relation in the forest induced by priority update over the just constructed
plausibility model and matching sequence of event models. We have:
h ≤ h′ iﬀ h 4F
DDL h′.
12Proof of the claim The proof is by induction on the length of histories. The base case is obvious
from the construction of our intitial model M. Now for the induction step. To simplify notation
we will write a ≤ b tfor a n
i b with n the length for which the claim has been proved, and i an
agent.
From DoTL to Forest(DDL) Assume that h1a ≤ h2b (1). It follows that in the constructed
event model a ≤ b (2). Case 1: a < b. By priority update we have h1a 4F
DDL h2b. Case 2: b ≤ a
(3). This means that there are h3b,h4a such that h3b ≤ h4a. But then by Preference Revelation
and (1) we have h1 ≤ h2 (in the doxastic temporal model). It follows by the inductive hypothesis
that h1 4F
DDL h2. But then by priority update, since by (2) and (3) a and b are indiﬀerent, we
have h1a 4F
DDL h2b.
From Forest(DDL) to DoTL Next let h1a 4F
DDL h2b. The deﬁnition of priority update has two
clauses. Case 1: a < b. By deﬁnition, this implies that b  ≤ a. But then by the above construction,
for all histories h3,h4 ∈ H we have h3b  ≤ h4a. In particular we have h2b  ≤ h1a. But then by
totality4, h1a ≤ h2b. Case 2: a≃b (4) and h1 4F
DDL h2. For a start, by the inductive hypothesis,
h1 ≤ h2 (5). By (4) and our construction, there are h3a,h4b with h3a ≤ h4b (6). But then by
Preference Propagation, (5) and (6) imply that we have h1a ≤ h2b.
Theorem. Let H be a doxastic-temporal model, M a plausibility model,   ǫ be a sequence of event
models while ⊗ is priority update. The following assertions are equivalent:
• H is isomorphic to the forest generated by M ⊗  ǫ,
• H satisﬁes bisimulation invariance, propositional stability, synchronicity, Preference Revela-
tion and Accommodation.
By Fact 3.6, Accommodation also gives us Preference Propagation.
Proof. Necessity of the conditions
The veriﬁcation of the conditions in the preceding subsection did not use totality. So we
concentrate on the new condition:
Accommodation Assume that ja ≤ j′b (1). It follows by the deﬁnition of priority update that
a ≤ b (2). Now let ha  ≤ h′b (3). This implies by priority update that a  < b (4). By deﬁnition,
(2) and (4) means that a≃b (5). Now assume that g ≤ g′ (6). It follows from (5), (6) and priority
update that ga ≤ g′b. For the other direction of the consequent assume instead that g  ≤ g′ (7). It
follows from (5), (7) and priority update that ga  ≤ g′b.
Suﬃciency of the conditions Given a DoTL model, we again construct a DDL plausibility
model plus sequence of event models:
4Note that this is the only place in which we make use of totality.
13Construction The plausibility model M =  W,( i)i∈N, ˆ V   is as follows:
• W := {h ∈ H | len(h) = 1},
• Set h  i h′ whenever ≤i,
• For every p ∈ Prop, ˆ V (p) = V (p) ∩ W.
We construct the j-th event model ǫj =  Ej,( 
j
i)i∈N,prej  as follows:
• Ej := {e ∈ Σ | there is a history of the form he ∈ H with len(h) = j}
• For each i ∈ N, a 
j
ib iﬀ either (a) there are ha,h′b ∈ H such that len(h) = len(h) = j and
ha ≤i h′b, or (b) [a new case] a and b are accommodating, and we put a ≃ b (i.e. a ≤ b and
b ≤ a).
• For each e ∈ Ej, let prej(e) be the formula that characterizes the set {h | he ∈ H and len(h) =
j}. Bisimulation invariance guarantees that there is always such a formula (maybe involving
an inﬁnitary syntax).
Again we show that the construction is correct in the following sense:
Claim 7.2 (Correctness). Let ≤ be the plausibility relation in the doxastic temporal model. Let
4F
DDL be the plausibility relation in the forest induced by successive priority updates of the plausi-
bility model by the sequence of event models we constructed. We have:
h ≤ h′ iﬀ h 4F
DDL h′.
Proof of the claim We proceed by induction on the length of histories. The base case is clear
from our construction of the initial model M.
Now for the induction step, with the same simpliﬁed notation as earlier.
From DoTL to Forest(DEL) We distinguish two cases.
Case 1. ha ≤ h′b,h ≤ h′. By the inductive hypothesis, h ≤ h′ implies h 4F
DDL h′ (1). Since
ha ≤ h′b, it follows by construction that a ≤ b (2). It follows from (1) and (2) that by priority
update ha 4F
DDL h′b.
Case 2. ha ≤ h′b,h  ≤ h′. Clearly, then, a and b are not accommodating and thus the
special clause has not been used to build the event model, though we do have a ≤ b (1). By the
contrapositive of Preference Revelation, we also conclude that for all ja,j′b ∈ H, we have j′b  ≤ ja
(2). Therefore, our construction gives b  ≤ a (3), and we conclude that a < b (4). But then by
priority update, we get ha 4F
DDL h′b.
From Forest(DEL) to DoTL We distinguish again two cases.
14Case 1. ha 4F
DDL h′b,h 4F
DDL h′. By deﬁnition of priority update, ha 4F
DDL h′b implies that
a ≤ b (1). There are two possibilities. Case 1: The special clause of the construction has been
used, and a, b are accommodating (2). By the inductive hypothesis, h 4F
DDL h′ implies h ≤ h′ (3).
But (2) and (3) imply that ha ≤ h′b. Case 2: Clause (1) holds because for some ja,j′b ∈ H, in the
DoTL model, ja ≤ j′b (4). By the inductive hypothesis, h 4F
DDL h′ implies h ≤ h′ (5). Now, it
follows from (4), (5) and Preference Propagation that ha ≤ h′b.
Case 2. ha 4F
DDL h′b,h  4F
DDL h′. Here is where we put our new accommodation clause
to work. Let us label our assertions: h  4F
DDL h′ (1) and ha 4F
DDL h′b (2). It follows from (1)
and (2) by the deﬁnition of priority update that a < b (3), and hence, by deﬁnition b  ≤ a (4).
Clearly, a and b are not accommodating (5): for otherwise, we would have had a≃b, and hence
b ≤ a, contradicting (4). Therefore, (3) implies that there are ja,j′b ∈ H with ja ≤ j′b (6). Now
assume for contradictio that (in the DoTL model) ha  ≤ h′b (7). It follows from (6) and (7) by
Accommodation that a and b are accommodating, contradicting (5). Thus we have ha ≤ h′b.
Theorem (Deﬁnability). Preference Propagation, Preference Revelation and Accommodation are
deﬁnable in the doxastic-epistemic temporal language DETL.
Proof. We only prove the case of Preference Propagation, the other two are in the extended version
of the paper. We drop agent labels for convenience.
(PP) characterizes Preference Propagation We ﬁrst show that (PP) is valid on all models
H based on preference-propagating frames. Assume that H,h ￿ E a  ≤i  b−1 ⊤ (1). Then there
are ja,j′b ∈ H such that ja ≤ j′b (2). Now let H,h ￿ ( ≤  b p ∧  a q) (3). Then there is
h′ ∈ H such that h ≤ h′ (4) and H,h′ ￿  b p (5), while also H,ha ￿ q (6). We must show that
H,h ￿  a (q ∧  ≤i p) (7). But, from (2),(4),(6) and Preference Propagation, we get ha ≤ h′b, and
the conclusion follows by the truth deﬁnition.
Next, we assume that axiom (PP) is valid on a doxastic temporal frame, that is, true under
any interpretation of its proposition letters. So, assume that ja ≤ j′b (1), and also h ≤ h′ (2).
Moreover, let ha,h′b ∈ H (3). First note that (1) automatically veriﬁes the antecedent of (PP)
in any node of the tree. Next, we make the antecedent of the second implication in (PP) true at
h by interpreting the proposition letter p as just the singleton set of nodes h′b, and q as just ha
(4). Since (PP) is valid, its consequent will also hold under this particular valuation V . Explicitly
we have H,V,h ￿  a (q ∧  ≤i p. But spelling out what p, q mean there, we get just the desired
conclusion that ha ≤ h′b.
Proposition (Undeﬁnability). Preference Propagation, Preference Revelation and Accommodation
are not deﬁnable in the forward looking fragment of DETL
Proof. The reason is the same in all cases: we show that these properties are not preserved under
taking bounded p-morphic images. Figure 1 gives an indication how this works concretely.
15b
≥ ≤ ≤
a a b
Figure 1: Propagation is not preserved under p-morphic images
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